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THE STATES AS NATIONAL AGENTS 
GILLIAN E. METZGER* 
INTRODUCTION 
I am delighted for the chance to engage with Heather Gerken’s work. I 
want to begin by offering tremendous kudos. I think the new nationalist school 
of federalism is a very exciting intellectual development. Over the years, many 
federalism scholars have emphasized the importance of state participation in 
federal programs.
1
 But Gerken’s recent writings, and those of other 
contributors—Abbe Gluck, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, and Erin Ryan—have 
forced this phenomenon onto center stage, highlighting the ways that 
devolution advances nationalist goals. With her characteristic elegance and 
provocation, Gerken’s Article contends that the centrality of nation-state 
conjoining requires casting aside some of our inherited but outmoded 
conceptions of nation and state as distinct entities. She challenges both 
nationalists and federalists to get with the times. For the nationalists, that 
means recognizing the value of decentralization and devolution.
2
 For the 
federalists, it means recognizing that states can wield powers even in these 
heavily nationalist contexts.
3
 
I agree with large parts of the nationalist school argument. The modern day 
reality is one of nation and state acting together, cheek by jowl. This reality 
deserves the pride of place that the nationalist school insists it receive. That 
said, I want to push back at Gerken’s contentions that the concepts of state 
autonomy and state sovereignty are now outmoded, as are nationalist concerns 
about dependence on state governance.
4
 The theme of my remarks is 
agreement but with a plea for a little bit more balance and nuance. We can 
 
* Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. 
 1. The classic exposition is DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM 
THE STATES 2, 51–80 (3d ed. 1984) (describing the scope, financing, and forms of sharing 
between state and federal actors). See also Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional 
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668–73 (2001) (emphasizing the 
political reality of cooperative federalism). 
 2. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 997, 1000 (2015) (stating decentralization and devolution are merely means toward “a 
well-functioning democracy”). 
 3. Id. at 1001. 
 4. Id. at 1009–10. 
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better profit by integrating the concerns of prior decades of federalism 
scholarship into the insights of the new. I will close with a few comments on 
the question of what the rules of engagement should be for the world of 
federal-state bargaining. Gerken urges that this is where federalism scholars 
should focus their attention, and rightfully so: it is the critical question for 
federalism going forward. 
I.  THE ONGOING RELEVANCE OF STATE AUTONOMY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
Let me begin with the issue of whether or not state autonomy and 
sovereignty are outmoded. There is a lot of power to the idea that it is time to 
get past state autonomy and state sovereignty as the sole bases of state power. 
Insofar as the new nationalist school’s point is to simply insist on the 
importance of the “power of the servant,” as Gerken has put it,
5
 then I am on 
board. But throughout her Article, Gerken pushes further and challenges the 
relevancy or coherency of invocations of state autonomy and state 
sovereignty.
6
 I think that additional move goes too far and risks undermining 
the very state role in national programs that the nationalist school emphasizes. 
To put the point directly: unless the motifs of state autonomy and state 
sovereignty are in the equation, I have trouble explaining why we should use 
states as national agents. To its credit, the nationalist school has engaged with 
the question of “why the states,” and has done a tremendous job of showing 
how the states add value to national programs and national politics. What 
strikes me, however, is how much of that value comes, at some background 
level, from the status of states as autonomous and sovereign. For example, one 
important benefit identified for the states, particularly by Jessica Bulman-
Pozen, is that they serve as sites for national political dialogue.
7
 But states are 
able to play this role not just because they have been incorporated into federal 
programs, but also because, critically, they are formally independent levels of 
government: they have distinct electoral bases and a claim to representative 
legitimacy. Their status as governments with aspects of sovereignty is central 
to their ability to help the nation work through contested issues. The fact that 
states set marriage laws is what has helped the same-sex marriage debate move 
forward; it is the fact that states play a big role in criminal law that has allowed 
them to push on the marijuana decriminalization front as well. States are able 
to experiment and help develop new ways of approaching federal programs 
precisely because they run programs. They are governments, and that relates 
closely to the idea of states as sovereign. 
 
 5. Id. at 1010. 
 6. Id. at 1022–24. 
 7. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2014). 
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In short, state autonomy and state sovereignty are an important part of why 
running national programs through the states adds value. As a result, going 
beyond the descriptive task of demonstrating how states are advancing national 
interests to query the ongoing coherency and relevancy of state autonomy, 
state sovereignty, or state interests risks significantly undercutting the 
federalism side of the nationalist school. To be sure, another central reason 
why this nation delegates so many responsibilities to the states is that states 
have tremendous historical, political, and cultural resonance. But incorporating 
the states into national programs also guarantees that they will continue to have 
that resonance. Before we reinforce the states in this fashion, I think that as a 
nation we need a clearer sense of why we might want to do so. To my mind, 
the reason to reinforce the relevance of the states is not simply the benefits for 
national programs or the kind of democracy that may therefore develop. It is 
also because of the constitutional weight assigned to the states and the respect 
due to states as part of our governmental structure. But emphasizing the 
constitutional stature of states and their governmental role quickly leads back 
to a discussion about state autonomy and state sovereignty. 
Hence, I don’t think we can really get rid of the concepts of state autonomy 
and state sovereignty quite as much as Gerken wishes. The real challenge 
posed by the new nationalist school is not for us to cast these concepts aside as 
outmoded, but instead for us to rethink what state autonomy and state 
sovereignty should and do mean today. What do state autonomy and state 
sovereignty mean in a world in which states are functioning and wielding their 
biggest powers as national agents? Understanding that these concepts have 
changed meaning but maintain their relevance hews closer to actual practice. 
In the healthcare context, for example, the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
federalism decision in NFIB v. Sebelius laid out the background constitutional 
ground rules that then shaped negotiations about how states would implement 
their responsibilities under the Affordable Care Act.
8
 Those negotiations have 
a different form after the Supreme Court’s decision, which relied on ideas of 
state sovereignty and autonomy.
9
 States now have different kinds of levers of 
power and influence. Even if you find the Supreme Court’s more state-
protective baseline constitutionally mistaken, that baseline is what may lead to 
many of the benefits that the new nationalists are identifying in state 
implementation of national programs. Figuring out how state autonomy and 
state sovereignty should and do come into the context of joint nation-state 
undertakings is thus a key element of the nationalist school’s descriptive and 
normative vision. 
 
 8. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). 
 9. Id. at 2578. 
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II.  THE HIDDEN COSTS OF NATIONAL DEPENDENCE ON THE STATES 
I also want to take up Gerken’s challenge to the nationalists to recognize 
the value of devolution and decentralization.
10
 Again, the new nationalist 
school of federalism has done a great job at showing a lot of the 
underappreciated benefits of having states as national agents for national 
programs—not just for states, but also for the nation. But I also think it is fair 
to say that as part of seeing their task to highlight those benefits, the new 
nationalist school has focused more on articulating the positive case for states 
as national agents and given less attention to what some of the downsides 
might be. Here, I just want to raise a cautionary flag and suggest that it is a 
little bit more empirically open whether or not using the states as national 
agents necessarily improves the structure of the national program or our 
national democracy. 
So what might be some of the downsides of states as national agents, and is 
nationalist caution on this front as outmoded as Gerken suggests? On the 
programmatic side, my expectation is that including states as national agents 
will slant national programs in particular directions. I think it leads to pressure 
to set programmatic requirements and demands at a sort of lowest common 
denominator level, so as to include as many states as possible. I also think it is 
likely that you will see certain kinds of politically unpopular groups and 
interests losing out. There is nothing unique about that; these groups and 
interests often lose out at the national level as well. But having the states serve 
as key program implementers opens up new political battlefields. Groups must 
battle on a state-by-state basis, rather than consolidate their political pressure 
and leverage at the national level. 
Again to its credit, the new nationalist school has addressed both the 
danger that state implementation will result in limited federal requirements and 
undermine the political power of unpopular groups and highlighted potentially 
countervailing benefits. Thus, Gluck has emphasized that relying on the states 
also plays an important role in getting federal programs off the ground to begin 
with; it lets the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent.
11
 Put differently, before 
we worry too much about lowest common denominator, we should realize that 
it may be the lowest common denominator or nothing. Similarly, Gerken has 
done a great job about talking about how pushing decisions down to the state 
 
 10. Gerken, supra note 2, at 1001–07. 
 11. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011) 
(discussing congressional reliance on state experimentation for implementation of federal 
statutes). 
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level actually may enhance the voice of minority groups.
12
 Even if these 
groups are disenfranchised or disengaged at the national level, at the state and 
local level these groups can be the deciders and exercise real power. 
These are important points, but it remains an open empirical question 
whether certain programmatic goals or the interests of minorities and 
unpopular groups are enhanced more by national or state implementation. In 
addition, I think that to really assess empirically whether state implementation 
benefits certain groups requires comparing apples to apples. This means not 
comparing states to Congress, where unpopular groups may not win out either, 
but rather comparing states to national administrators. I am not convinced that 
the calculus will be as favorable as the nationalist school suggests. 
Moreover, state involvement does not only mean including the state 
legislature, where a variety of groups and interests may have a voice, but also 
means giving a central programmatic role to state governors and other 
statewide elected officials who control state administration. A key question 
then is whether certain voices will be excluded or will wield less influence at 
the gubernatorial and other statewide levels. In the Affordable Care Act 
rollout, I think we have seen that certain interest groups have had limited 
influence. Governors have taken positions at odds with the interests of some 
groups within their states, such as those who would benefit from expansion of 
their states’ Medicaid program, often for political or ideological reasons.
13
 
A third reason to question whether including the states always enhances 
national programs and national democracy is that structuring programs in this 
fashion may serve to give certain views an outsized voice on the national 
political stage—outsized relative to their actual public support. A similar 
concern is sometimes raised with respect to equal state representation in the 
Senate, which is said to provide small states disproportionate influence.
14
 
 
 12. See Gerken, supra note 2, at 1006 (noting federalism’s benefits for minorities and further 
scholarship which explores the topic). See also Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 
YALE L.J. 1958 (examining the effects of federalism on dissenters and minorities); Heather K. 
Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 44–73 (2010) (discussing the democratic nature of “federalism-all-the-way-down” as it 
pertains to minorities). 
 13. See Frank J. Thompson & Michael K. Gusmano, The Administrative Presidency and 
Fractious Federalism: The Case of Obamacare, 44 PUBLIUS 426, 430–36 (2014) (describing 
Republican ideological opposition to expanding Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act); see 
also Timothy J. Conlan & Paul L. Posner, Inflection Point? Federalism and the Obama 
Administration, 41 PUBLIUS 421, 423–24 (2011) (discussing the difficulty of the National 
Governor’s Association to deliver a clear message given the increasing polarization amongst state 
actors). 
 14. See Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has 
Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 21, 24–47 (1997) (discussing the disproportionate power smaller states 
wield within the Senate); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: 
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Whether or not this outsized voice for those states that are resisting national 
policy leans conservative or progressive depends a great deal on the politics 
that dominates at the national level. Moreover, Jessica Bulman-Pozen has 
underscored how, at times, involving the states has served to check inaction 
and failure to regulate at the national level.
15
 Still, my guess is that the most 
prominent voices at the state level will often tend towards resisting national 
policy. Resistance generates more attention as a voice within a national 
program than an insistence on really implementing federal policy strongly. 
Indeed, instances in which the states are prodding the national government to 
go further often involve the states wielding their independent powers. An 
example is New York’s recent efforts to get the national government to 
regulate and enforce more on the securities front. New York’s Attorney 
General not only pushed the Securities and Exchange Commission to be more 
aggressive in enforcing national securities laws, but he also wielded his 
independent state powers under New York’s Martin Act.
16
 
Again, my point is not to deny the benefits of state implementation, but 
rather to underscore the need for more comprehensive assessment of the 
empirical effects of state participation in national programs. The nationalist 
school has offered an incredibly rich, but nonetheless somewhat anecdotal 
account of these effects. A fuller account would allow greater nuance on how 
national programs are hurt as well as helped, and democracy is hurt as well as 
helped, by implementing national initiatives through the states. 
III.  THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR STATES AS NATIONAL AGENTS 
Lastly, I want to respond to Gerken’s identification of the need to develop 
“rules of engagement,” a point that Gluck has also emphasized.
17
 Some 
potential suggestions on this front can be drawn from my earlier comments.
18
 
 
WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 49–62 
(2006) (arguing states are overrepresented because each gets two Senate votes regardless of total 
population). For a skeptical view of claims for excessive small state influence, see John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 
746–48 (2002) (noting that supermajority rules can be viewed as properly reflecting the equality 
of states). 
 15. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 486–98 (2012). 
 16. See Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot 
Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 126–33 (2004) (describing then New York State Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer’s push to actively engage the SEC in enforcing securities regulations); see 
also Mike McIntire, Two Views of a Rising Star: Populist Warrior or Reckless Foe of Big 
Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, at 35 (describing Attorney General Spitzer’s powers under 
the New York’s Martin Act). 
 17. Gerken, supra note 2, at 1029; Gluck, supra note 11, at 549–50. 
 18. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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For instance, perhaps there should be a presumption of local as well as state 
involvement in national programs. Such a presumption might help ensure that 
running national programs through the states gives minorities more of a 
decision-making role, but it might make administering programs more 
difficult. Such a presumption might also work to the detriment of the states by 
making it more likely that national programs will serve to break open the states 
and perhaps undermine the states’ ability to control what are otherwise seen as 
parts of the state government. Hence, it may not be an appropriate presumption 
to adopt, but it represents one potential approach to designing state and 
national engagement. 
My focus here, however, is on the question of what rules might follow 
from the idea of states as national agents. Perhaps revealing that I am, in 
Gerken’s evocative phrase, an “aging boxing club member[]”
19
 in the 
nationalist camp, I want to suggest that if the states are going to serve as 
national agents, national supervision of state implementation becomes critical. 
Setting the terms of that supervision is a key part of working out what the new 
nationalism will mean in practice. 
Why do I think supervision matters so much? In part, it stems from the 
idea of what it means to be an agent. In Hollingsworth v. Perry,
20
 albeit in the 
different context of justiciability, the Supreme Court emphasized a principal’s 
rights to control as central to what it means to be an agent and the relationship 
of agency.
21
 The discussion in Hollingsworth itself is a bit contrived, and I do 
not believe the Court successfully justifies its ultimate result. Nonetheless, the 
principal’s ability to control an agent is an important feature of agency. This 
emphasis on control also arises in the other body of law that addresses agents 
of the national government: administrative law. A recurrent theme in 
administrative law is identifying the proper agency relationships for national 
agencies.
22
 Are they agents of Congress? The President? The courts? The 
people? All of the above? A second theme is determining how best to reinforce 
and preserve these relationships, and, here, the idea of supervision and 
oversight is particularly central.
23
 
 
 19. Gerken, supra note 2, at 997. 
 20. 133 S. Ct. 2562 (2013) (holding that proponents of California’s same-sex marriage bill 
(Proposition 8) did not have standing to appeal district court’s order declaring the Proposition 
unconstitutional). 
 21. Id. at 2666–68. 
 22. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579–80 (1984) (noting the confusion about the role 
agencies play in our government). 
 23. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L. J. 
(forthcoming 2015) (“[D]emonstrat[ing] the constitutional significance of systemic administration 
and justify[ing] recognition of a constitutional duty to supervise.”). 
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Here, too, we need to focus on supervision of the states insofar as they are 
serving as national agents implementing national programs. More than this, we 
need to focus on a particular form of supervision, namely supervision by 
national agencies. The reason for emphasizing supervision by national 
agencies is separation of powers. Bulman-Pozen has argued that involving 
states as national agents serves separation of powers goals by offering a means 
by which Congress can check the executive branch.
24
 This checking function is 
an important feature to consider in devising the rules of engagement for states 
as national agents. But there are also separation of powers considerations that 
limit the extent to which we should see Congress as free to use the states as 
national agents against the executive branch. In particular, such a model is in 
tension with our separation of powers system’s vesting responsibility for 
taking care the federal law be faithfully executed in the President. One way to 
try to accommodate this countervailing separation of powers concern is to 
ensure that the states are subject to supervision and oversight by national 
administrative agencies, so that even if the states operate to check the execute 
branch, they are also subject to the executive branch’s control. 
Yet the rules of engagement for the states as national agents cannot be 
approached solely through a separation of powers lens, whether focused on 
checking executive branch overreach or preserving adequate executive branch 
control. It is also necessary to consider whether the rules of engagement for the 
states as national agents should differ from those applicable to other national 
agents precisely because they are states. Moreover, if the fact that the states are 
involved leads to different rules for them as national agents, it is not just 
because we want states to have the freedom to experiment and to force issues 
onto the national agenda in ways that the new nationalists have charted for us. 
It is also because our system has two constitutional structural principles, 
federalism as well as separation of powers, and the rules we come up with to 
figure out what that relationship should be must take account of both. Hence, 
we are back to the need to understand what state autonomy and state 
sovereignty mean in a world of national federalism in order to develop rules of 
engagement for the states as national agents. 
CONCLUSION 
Heather Gerken challenges both federalists and nationalists to recognize 
that their long-held analytic frameworks are out-of-date and dispense with their 
now-antiquated commitments to state autonomy and state sovereignty on the 
one hand and resistance to decentralization and devolution on the other. My 
comments here query whether, in fact, these analytic concerns are as outdated 
 
 24. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 486–98. 
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as Gerken contends. But they should not obscure Gerken’s key insight, an 
insight shared by her fellow collaborators in the new nationalist school of 
federalism: that our contemporary reality is one in which nation and state are 
deeply intermingled and the central task going forward, for federalists and 
nationalists alike, is to determine the best rules of engagement for this 
intermingled world. 
